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Steinberg: Ralph Barton Perry, the Moralist as Critic

Ralph B a rton Perry ,
The Mora lis t A s Cr itic
by Ira S. Steinberg

Ralph Barton Perry took his undergraduate work at Princeton and his
graduate work at Harvard where he was awarded the doctorate in the
field of philosophy in 1899. Dudng the first decade of the present century he gained recognition as a leader of the New Realism perhaps
the most significant product of which was his " Ego-centric Predica ment"
published in the Journal of Philosophy in 1910. His most prominent
publications were Present Philosophical Tendencies, 1912; General Th eory
of Valu e, 1926; The Thoug ht and Character of William James, 2 vols. ,
1935, for which he received a Pulitzer Prize; Puritanism and D emocracy,
1944; and Realms of Valu e, 1954.
Throughout his career he was concerned, as a philosopher and as a
member of the faculty at Harvard, with the criticism and development
of educational policy and practice.
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Steinberg: Ralph Barton Perry, the Moralist as Critic
The concern of a critic of education may be more than a concern merely to complain,
or to find fault, or to promote some particular objectives or practices. One may be
concerned to understand education, to see what may be said sensibly about it, to see
what sense can be made of what is said about it. Interest in understanding education
may be primarily intellectual, an interest in understanding just for the sake of understanding. Such an interest is, on the other hand, of paramount practicality to one
who would propose to influence educational practices and objectives. Whatever one
proposes it is helpful to have some reason to feel that his proposal makes sense.
Now, while it should seem obvious that the desire to understand education and the
desire to influence education are two different sorts of desire, there is a peculiar fuzziness about practical proposals making sense that tends to obscure the distinction.
There is the danger, if one is not careful, of packing prescriptions for education
into the description of education. This is preCisely what Ralph Barton Perry did in
a most sophisticated way in his Realms of Value,l which accordingly proVides an
interesting source for illustrating the difficulty in question.
What makes Realms of Value such an interesting source is the fact that it was
not intended as a general critique of education, but, rather, was intended as a general critique of civilization. 2 Perry sought to formulate the lines of criticism, or the
criteria for the examination and evaluation of man's institutions and their respective
sciences. 3 In applying these criteria he devoted a chapter to "Education and the
Science of Education."4 It should be remarked that Perry's views on education were
not confined to one chapter in one book written toward the close of his career, but
had developed through continued concern throughout his career. 5 Only here they
were presented in what appears to have been their most considered, carefully drawn,
systematic version. And system was provided by the very endeavor to apply to education the lines of criticism he had fashioned for the general critique of culture. 6 This
approach, wherein the critic first elucidates his position as a critic on broad lines,
commends itself, at least on first view, as in principle committed to a stance of in1partiality with respect to the objects of his examination. It inspires a sense of confidence in the objectivity of the critic. Still, Perry had axes to grind and in Realms
of Value, he ground them in two different ways - one way open and above board,
the other way sub rosa. Each of these will be considered in turn and then Perry's
contribution to the quest for objectivity in the examination of education will then
be discussed.
I

A Moralist's Point of View
In his preface to Realms of Value Perry announced his intention of setting
forth and applying a fundamental definition of value to the task of defining and
evaluating institutions and their special branches of knowledge. 7 He had developed
this fundamental definition of value at great length in his General Theory of Value 8
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published twenty-eight years earlier and had fairly well stuck with it, although with
some significant modifications in technical detail, as he set it forth in the publication
under discussion. As shall be seen in the present section, there can be some quarrel
with a philosopher's wanting to test out, as it were, his theory of value by considering its applicability in the various realms of human concern. There is, however,
something more peculiar about the attempt to use it to prOVide the very structure
of the individual realms of concern which are then to be evaluated. This latter problem will be discussed more fully in the following section. It is mentioned here only
to pOint out that there appears to have been something odd in the way Perry conceived his task right from the outset of Realms of Value.
It will not be necessary for present purposes to go into his theory of value in
any great detail. A thumbnail sketch is appropriate. Value was taken as any object
of any interest. Interest was conceived as a disposition; positive interest was an attitude in favor of its object which was thereby good , negative interest an attitude of
rejection toward its object which was thereby evil. Man had to take something as
the object of interest, but interest and not judgment conferred value on objects. As
man has many interests and these conflict for time, energy, and or the consumption
of external resources, he must somehow organize them. Perry advanced the principles
of harmonious integration of interests at the personal and inter-personal levels. At
the personal level man was to develop enlightened self-interest in maximizing his
goods. At the inter-personal level harmonious integration required that the self-interest
of each man was to be colored by the benevolent interest in advancing the interests
of others. Each man was to be committed to the procedure of reasoned discussion for
9
the advancement of the maximum good for all people.
It will not be possible, nor is it necessary, here to go into a detailed critique
of Perry's theory. Suffice it to say that Perry attempted to argue for the basic definition of value as stemming from the nature of man at the same time that he advanced
a procedure for comparing values which had to be implanted in man. lo Of more
immediate relevance is the fact that, with suitable translations of terminology, Perry's
theory of value was also his theory of morality . The " person" is one who does
integrate his interests in the appropriate manner; the " moral person " is one who
has developed a benevolent interest for the sake of harmonious integration. The
moral good is harmonious integration of interests or harmonious happiness. So far
it is clear that Perry was defining morality . Whether he recognized that he was merely
stipulating the definition of morality or whether he thought he was doing something
else is not important so long as it is recognized that if morality is thus a matter of
definition, other " good" definitions are, at least in prinCiple, conceivable. II At any
rate, some notion has been proVided as to what Perry had in mind when he approached the moral critique of institutions and of the sciences.
Now, so long as one is careful to specify that his stance is a moral stance
and, moreover, to specify just what that moral stance is, there can be no legitimate
complaint about his criticizing institutions and the sciences from the moral pOint of
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view. Depending upon one's conception of morality political practices particularly
efficacious in getting things done may, none the less, be morally repugnant. Good
history on some topics may , indeed, by some standards seem better not done. Pornography and literary craftsmanship are not mutually exclusive. " Good " medical
science may recommend morally repugnant experiments on human beings. The physical scientist faces moral questions when he is called upon to advance knowledge in
the fields of mass destruction. It is difficult to think of an area of human concern
to which no moral critique would be relevant. But, then, how would one go about
testing the applicability of his moral stance to a particular area of concern especially
if one is, as Frankena has put it, a definist? 12
It will not do at this point to remind one 's self that, after all, it was not the
moral stance that was to be tested, but the fundamental definition of value. The very
generality of Perry's definition of value makes it, in effect, impervious to the sort of
test he had in mind. If, indeed, any object whatsoever has value by virtue of interest
taken in it by anyone, then anything that anyone wants to do in any area of concern is ipso facto valuable. Perhaps Perry is to be commended for so defining value
as to make it truly general in applicability, but its generality appears to have been
bought at the price of trivializing the concept of value and the notion of evaluation.
The fundamental definition of value, then, was not to be tested, but, rather, the developed conception of value which, as has been indicated, was tantamount to Perry 's
conception of morality.
To return, then, to the question posed, what sense can be made out of testing
one's conception of morality by applying it to the realms of value ? For the definist
to show that people do in fact apply the criteria in question in such areas is not
very helpful, for, in the first place, this would suggest the legitimacy of other conflicting definist criteria, and in the second place, neither establishes the correctness
of common practice 13 nor the primacy of his particular practice over others. One
ma y even que s t ion the legitimacy of proposing as a test that criteria be general
enough to cover all areas of concern. It may well appear desirable to permit some
ambigUity in the applicability of the criteria of morality such that, for example, one
might wish to leave religion and the morality of religion free from the " onsl aught
of secularism " as some might put it or to leave science free from the onslaught of
the InquiSition as it ha s been known to operate. 14
The chief trouble in presuming to test by applicability with definism in general
and with Perry 's definition in particular is that one is attempting, in effect, to gauge
the quality of the lens through which one views the world by looking through that
lens. Any other lens is rejected as not being that lens. There is the danger that the
definist may not recognize that in defining morality as he does he may not be prepared to accept as a moral problem in some area of concern what may appear as
such to someone looking through a different moral lens. To develop the ramifications of the principle of harmoniOUS happiness may require and display a truly
remarkable depth and breadth of knowledge; it ma y display brilliance of inSight
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and intelligence, but if it tests anything, it tests the endurance of the applier in sticking to the task he has set for himself and in so doing it attests to the constancy of
his conviction in his moral stance. In essence, such a test might be viewed as a man
telling himself " If I can go through such an exercise as this without thinking of
some reason to question this stance, it must be pretty good."
This is by no means to be taken as a condemnation of such a procedure. Perhaps this is the best that one can do in the way of " testing" his moral principles.
At the very least Perry has considered the ramifications of his principles more deeply
and in a much wider context than most of us are likely to consider ours. But Perry
did more than what has been suggested thus far; he went further and defined his
moral principles into the structures of the areas of his concern. And with this we
must now take issue.
II

The M ora/i;:ing Scientist
Perry looked at institutions as instituted by men for human purposes. IS However they might have developed originally, their maintenance and further development was taken to reflect a rationale for their maintenance and development to be
drawn in terms of human interests. And, when Perry drew a rationale in terms of
interest he drew a moral rationale. Indeed, his theory of society consisted in yet another translation of his theory of value which, it may be remembered, was by translation also his theory of morality. In view of the description of his theory of morality
briefly though it was presented earlier, it should not be surprising that his theory
of society consisted in an exposition of democracy and its defense on moral grounds. 16
ThiS, in capsule form, represents an example of how Perry loaded his moral stance
into the very structure of political science, for it set the ultimate goals of political
science as providing criticism in the name of and technology directed toward the
creation of this ideal polity as he drew it. 17
Perry divided what he called the cultural sciences into three groups: the moral
sciences, including ethics, political SCience, jurisprudence, and economics; the nonmoral sciences (but with moral implications), including science and aesthetics; the
supra-moral sciences (having moral and non-moral aspects), including education
and religion. 1s The moral sciences and supra-moral sciences were such by virtue of
the moral character of their respective institutions. The cultural sciences were characterized as having their normative, technological and explanatory methods, or better,
methods of critique. The first involved criticism by comparison with some standard
such as a goal to be achieved; the second involved the consideration of techniques
for achieving a goal; and the third represented what one might normally think of as
descriptive, or, perhaps better, as that not directly or indirectly prescriptive aspect
of any science. The normative critique of institutions might be final or instrumental,
I.e. in terms of its constancy in keeping to its proper or ultimate end (for a moral
institution this would be its moral end), and in terms of the efficacy of its efforts
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toward that end. Moreover, the critique of an institution might be internal or external, that is, essentially, in terms of its truth to its purposes, or as it relates to
or effects the ends of other institutions. 19 For immediate purposes it would appear
that we are concerned with the final or the normative internal critique of education
- the critique of education by what education is for. We must remind ourselves,
however, that our concern is not so much with what Perry had to say about education as it is with how he wanted to talk about education.
Perry spoke of the ulterior purpose of education and, as nearly as can be determined, the ulterior purpose of education was intended by Perry as the internal
normative purpose or final end of education. It was to include a moral dimension
and a non-moral dimension. Here then is how Perry meant to apply his definition
of value to the task of structuring a science. He was a definist to the core; he did
not stop with defining morality but used his definition of morality to define education.
As one would have expected, this moral component of the ulterior purpose of education was to prepare the individual for, and commit him to, a life of personal and
inter-personal harmonious integration of interests. The other, or non-moral component was to develop the individual's intellectual and aesthetic interests to whatever
Perry meant by their own intrinsic perfection. 20 A moment 's reflection should lead
one to realize that the so-called non-moral component of the ulterior purpose of education has, on Perry's conception of morality, distinct moral relevance for they determine the variety and level of the goods to be integrated.
But, then, what else could the final purpose of education be but moral? If it
is now recalled that any institution exists by virtue, in effect, of its social utility and
social utility was to be determined through the processes of harmonious integration,
which is the moral procedure paT excellence, then it is clear that all institutions are
moral institutions, (the distinction between moral and non-moral institutions is questionable on Perry's terms) and that the final purpose of education must be the moral
purpose. Any purpose whatsoever arrived at in accordance with the procedures of
harmonious integration would be a moral purpose. The question, then, is: Where
did Perry get his mandate for the particular purpose that he set forth ?
To raise this question is by no means to argue that it does not make sense
for him to set forth the ulterior purpose that he did. It is clear that, given his moral
stance, it would have been surprising had he not considered the ultimate purpose
of education to be to bolster and foster that stance. It is, nevertheless misleading of
him to have talked about the ulterior purpose of education when, in fact, he had
to mean the ultimate aim he would set for education. There is a difference between
saying, in effect, "education means ... " and "education ought to mean .. .. " And,
of course, there is the obvious advantage in obscuring this distinction of denying
out of hand the legitimacy of positions derived from moral stances other than one's
own.
Again, it is a perfectly respectable enterprise to consider the implications of
one's moral position for education so long as one does not lapse into a form of
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expression which suggests that he is finding his morality in education rather than
putting it there. This must apply even to one who, like Perry, seeks to promote a
conception of morality based on commitment to principles of rationality, impartiality,
benevolence and objectivity. With this limitation in mind, it is now appropriate to
consider Perry's contribution to the objective examination of education.

III
Objectives and Objectivity 21
After the final, or internal normative purposive critique, it is not so difficult
to deal with the other elements of Perry's framework for the critique of institutions
as set forth earlier. Continuing with the normative the remaining categories under
this head are internal normative instrumental, external normative purposive and
external normative instrumental. Whatever one has taken to be the ultimate purpose
of education the internal normative instrumental critique involves the endeavor to
measure the success of the teacher or school in promoting it and involves the attempt to determine the progress of the student toward the goals stipulated. 22 The
external normative purposive critique serves as a wise reminder that there are all
sorts of pressures put upon education by those who would judge education by its
contributions to goals set from outside. It encourages one to recognize, for example,
that education may be called upon to alleviate an economic difficulty for society and
indeed may be criticized for the readiness with which people in education are willing
to accept such a goal. At the same time it does not require construing this goal as
intrinsically an educational goal. 23 The external normative instrumental critique
would attempt to measure success in achieving a particular goal in terms relevant
to that goal.
The explanatory method of educational science would be concerned with explaining the content of education as well as the process of education. It would, according to Perry, involve the special skills of all the sciences. It would involve the
study by those qualified for the study of the social, political, economic and other
factors influencing the content and organization of education as organized education
has developed and as it operates in the present. It would require the study of factors
influenCing and impinging upon the developmental and intellectual growth of human
beings by specialists not only in psychology but in all the natural sciences. 24 This,
then, represents a plea for the development of knowledge of education on objective
grounds by appeal to the talents of those committed to their disciplinary canons of
objectivity.
The technological aspect of educational science, the technological critique or
method of educational science, involves the development and evaluation of techniques
of education. Perry viewed educational technology as neutral with respect to the uses
to which it might be put as on analogy With, say, industrial technology.25 Detail
or content might differ depending upon the end but the technology involved in hav-
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ing machines stamp out hub caps is essentially the same technology for having machines stamp out shell casings. (We shall return to raise questions about this in a
moment. )
These various aspects of critique are not, of course, unrelated and Perry did
go on to rough out, by example primarily, some of the relationships. Obviously,
the explanatory method in uncovering factors impinging upon learning also was to
prOVide insight into the factors to be taken account of in instrumental critique. Thus
it is one thing to determine the extent of success in meeting a goal and another thing
to explain that extent of success or to weigh judgments or responsibility, praise, or
blame. Also, as knowledge of how humans do learn various sorts of things increases,
the development and evaluation of technology intended to facilitate such learning
may proceed more intelligently. This last statement may suggest some ambiguity in
Perry's attribution of the neutrality of educational technology.
Perry was, in fact, not too clear on this point. His notion of technology was
not so limited as to presume uniformity in fundamental procedure in all areas within
a field, he just treated it so generally as to be uninformative as to what a more
developed position might be. It does not appear, on the whole, inconsistent with his
position on educational technology to suggest that different people might have to be
taught a given subject in different ways or that different subjects might have to be
taught to a given person in different ways. Yet he did leave himself open to some
doubt on this question in suggesting as his example that educational technology is
neutral as between education for peace or education for war. 26
If one takes Perry's stand on indoctrination into account his notion of neutrality
appears even more confused . He argued quite forcefully for the indoctrination of the
ideals of democracy. 27 Given his exposition of these ideals as including tolerance,
objectivity, and scholarly integrity in all fields of interest, it must be clear that the
techniques for the indoctrination of these ideals would not be quite the same as those
for the indoctrination of blind acceptance of the dogmatic authority of state or church
for the ultimate decisions on all questions. If Perry meant that indoctrination indicates
a purposiveness to implant a doctrine, then indoctrination is, in that respect, neutral.
If, however, he intended to suggest that indoctrination indicates a specifiC technique
neutral with respect to the particular doctrines to be implanted, then his position
would indeed be questionable. It would appear, then, that his position regarding
technological neutrality was rather superficial and left much to be worked out, to
say the least.
The p;-oblem does serve, however, to illuminate the tension in Perry's Realms
of Valu e between his own commitment to objectivity and his commitment to the promotion of his conception of morality and the good society which it envisioned. The
missionary interest tended to subordinate the sCientific interest. It is difficult to develop objective analyses when one is bent on furthering a " greater" cause.
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